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IMPROVING CUSTODY LAW IN VIRGINIA WITHOUT
CREATING A REBUTrABLE PRESUMPTION OF JOINT
CUSTODY
I. INTRODUCTION
In its most basic form, child custody is the "care, control and
maintenance of a child which may be awarded by a court to one of
the parents as in a divorce or separation proceeding."1 Funda-
mental changes since the 1970s in the structure of American
society, law, and the family, however, have augmented and continue
to challenge this basic definition.' Child custody arrangements may
now range from the most common sole custody3 to joint legal
custody4 to joint physical custody;' include split custody6 or tem-
porary custody;7 or be defined as shared custody,8 divided custody9
or non-parent custody.10
Presently, the custody of minor children in Virginia is deter-
mined by courts in accordance with the "best interests of the child"
standard,' which is governed by nine statutory factors a court must
consider in its decision. 2 The court may award joint custody or sole
custody, where sole custody is defined as one person who "retains
1. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 385 (6th ed. 1990).
2. See Josie Redwine, In Re A.R.B.: Toward a Redefinition of the Best Interests Standard
in Georgia Child Custody Cases, 11 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 711 (1995) (discussing the appearance
in the 1970s of no-fault divorce laws, single-parent homes, blended families and stepparents).
3. See Jay Folberg, Custody Overview, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 3, 6
(Jay Folberg ed., 1984) (defining sole custody).
4. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (6th ed. 1990). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1
(Michie 1950).
5. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (6th ed. 1990). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1
(Michie 1950).
6. See Folberg, supra note 3, at 6 (defining split custody). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
108.2 (Michie 1950) (defining split custody as each parent having physical custody of a child
born to the parents).
7. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (6th ed. 1990) (defining temporary custody as
award of custody temporarily to parent awaiting outcome of separation or divorce
proceeding).
8. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(G)(3)(c) (Michie 1950) (defining shared custody
for purposes of calculating child support as each parent having physical custody of the child
for more than 110 days each year).
9. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 385 (6th ed. 1990) (defining divided custody as, "where
child lives with each parent part of the year . . . parent with whom child is living has
complete control over child during that period").
10. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (Michie 1950) (defining a "person with a
legitimate interest" in custody to include, among others, grandparents and stepparents).
11. § 20-124.2.B. Current legislation proposes to substitute the phrase "needs of the
child" to replace the "best interests of the child" standard. H.B. 1239, Reg. Sess. (Va. 1998).
12. See § 20-124.3. See also text accompanying infra note 60.
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responsibility for the care and control of a child," with "primary
authority to make decisions concerning the child."' 3 In determining
custody arrangements, courts are instructed to "assure minor chil-
dren of frequent and continuing contact with both parents, when
appropriate, and encourage parents to share in the responsibilities
of rearing their children."'14 No presumption or inference of law is
given in favor of either parent with regard to custody. 5
In Virginia, child custody law may be facing significant changes
in the near future. In the past legislative session a bill,'6 intro-
duced on January 22, 1996, to require judges to presume that joint
legal and physical custody is in the best interests of the child in
child custody cases, passed the Virginia Senate but was held over
by the House of Delegates for further consideration. 7 The original
Senate Bill 496 ultimately failed when an amendment in the nature
of a substitute was introduced by the House of Delegates on
December 20, 1996, instructing courts to give "due consideration to
the benefits to the child of joint legal and physical custody ....
In essence, this amendment would have formalized consideration
of joint custody as one of the nine factors used to determine the
custody arrangement in the best interests of the child. The
alternative would not likely have affected custody law in Virginia
as dramatically as a rebuttable presumption of joint custody, but
sought to more clearly delineate the alternative of joint custody as
a consideration in custody determinations. At the time of this
writing, neither the original proposal for a rebuttable presumption
of joint custody nor the House of Delegates' amendment merely
requiring "due consideration" of joint custody has been written into
law. An amendment to revise the definition of joint custody is,
however, pending in the General Assembly. 9
Virginia was not the only state to consider a presumption of
joint custody in 1996. Presumptions for joint custody passed in the
13. § 20-124.1.
14. § 20-124.2.
15. See id.
16. S. 496, Reg. Sess. (Va. 1996). Senate Bill 496 was introduced by Senator Mark Earley
to amend and reenact Virginia Code Section 20-124.2 ("court-ordered custody and visitation
arrangements') by inserting the phrase "[tihere shall be a rebuttable presumption that joint
legal and physical custody is in the best interests of the minor child or children." Id.
17. See S. 496, Reg. Sess. (Va. 1996), available in WESTLAW, Bill Tracking File (stating
Senate Bill 496 passed the Virginia Senate 21-Y to 19-N on February 13, 1996).
18. S. 496, Reg. Sess. (Va. 1996) (amended by House of Delegates on Dec. 20, 1996).
19. See H.B. 1239, Reg. Sess. (Va. 1998).
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Senates of Georgia and Michigan in February of 1996.20 Nation-
wide, at least fourteen states and the District of Columbia2' have
some form of presumption for joint custody.22
This Note addresses the advisability of adopting a rebuttable
presumption of joint custody in Virginia. Part Two provides an
overview of child custody law and its historical basis. Part Three
surveys the development of child custody laws through Virginia
case law. Part Four discusses the advantages and disadvantages
of joint custody. Part Five suggests an alternative solution for
Virginia custody law in lieu of a presumption of joint legal and
physical custody The conclusion offered in Part Six includes a
discussion of the consequences of a presumption of joint custody.
II. OVERVIEW OF CHILD CUSTODY LAW: HISTORICAL BASIS TO
PRESENT
A. The Meaning of Joint Custody
Little consensus exists among states with regard to definitions
and interpretations of custody terms.23 A generally accepted
definition of 'Joint custody," also referred to as "shared parenting,"
is "any form of custody or visitation arrangement which allows both
parents to have lots of normal, day-by-day interaction with the off-
spring and provides that each adult participates in both the
responsibilities and the rewards of child raising."24 Jay Folberg has
further elaborated on the concept of joint legal custody:
20. See Presumption for Joint Custody Takes Effect in Washington, D.C., Speak Out For
Children (Q. Newsl. of Children's Rights Council, Inc.), Spring, 1996, at 1, 5 [hereinafter
Presumption for Joint Custody].
21. States with a presumption of joint custody as defined by "law, court ruling or
frequency of availability" include: California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas.
See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Make Room for Daddy, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1997, at 48, 50.
22. California was the first state to authorize the option of joint custody which occurred
in 1979. See Elizabeth Simpson, State Bill Presuming Joint Custody Stirs Parents Backers
Say Bill Would Be Fairer to Fathers; Opponents Fear Children Would Be Treated as Pawns,
VA. PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Nov. 25, 1996, at B1. The option of joint custody is now almost
universally recognized in the United States, with South Carolina remaining the only state
not permitting joint custody arrangements. See Goldberg, supra note 21, at 49.
23. See Marsha Kline et al., Children's Adjustment in Joint and Sole Physical Custody
Families, 25 DEV. PSYCHOL. 430 (1989). See also Frederic W. Ilfeld, Jr. et al., Does Joint Cus-
tody Work? A First Look at Outcome Data of Relitigation, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62 (1982).
24. rlfeld et al., supra note 23, at 62 (citing P. WOOLLEY, THE CUSTODY HANDBOOK 13
(1979)).
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The distinguishing feature of joint custody is that both parents
retain legal responsibility and authority for the care and control
of the child, much as in an intact family. Joint custody upon
divorce is defined here as an arrangement in which both
parents have equal rights and responsibilities regarding major
decisions and neither parent's rights are superior. Joint
custody basically means providing each parent with an equal
voice in the children's education, upbringing, religious training,
nonemergency medical care, and general welfare. The parent
with whom the child is residing at the time must make immedi-
ate and day-to-day decisions regarding discipline, grooming,
diet, activities, scheduling social contacts, and emergency care.25
Joint physical custody, in contrast, "refers to the sharing of
residential care of the child or, in other words, regularly switching
with whom the child lives."26 Hence, joint custody arrangements
are often distinguished in statutes and research studies27 as being
of two types: "joint legal custody" and "joint physical custody."
Virginia, for example, defines "joint legal custody" as an arrange-
ment "where both parents retain joint responsibility for the care
and control of the child and joint authority to make decisions
concerning the child even though the child's primary residence may
be with only one parent .. . ."" "Joint physical custody" exists
"where both parents share physical and custodial care of the child
. "...29 When granting an order of joint custody, courts in Virginia
are authorized to grant either form or any combination of the two
deemed to be in the best interest of the child.3 °
25. Folberg, supra note 3, at 7.
26. Id.
27. In general, researchers of joint custody define "joint custody" in their studies as 'joint
physical custody" where the child is "spending at least 30% of the time with one of the
parents, and the remaining time with the other." Joan B. Kelly, Longer-Term Adjustment
in Children of Divorce: Converging Findings and Implications for Practice, 2 J. FAM.
PSYCHOL. 119, 130-31 (1988). See also Meyer Elkin, Joint Custody: Affirming That Parents
and Families are Forever, SOC. WORK, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 18, 20 (stating "[]oint custody does
not mean a rigid 50-50 division of residence').
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (Michie 1950).
29. Id.
30. See id.
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B. A Brief History of Child Custody Law
Historically, fathers held a property right in their children.3'
Upon separation or divorce, the legal doctrine of paternal familius
dictated that fathers receive custody of their children.32 In the
nineteenth century, however, the "best interests of the child" stan-
dard emerged as a shift away from recognizing fathers' exclusive
custody rights.33 Pursuant to this new standard, children were
deemed entitled to the best post-separation custody determination
possible.34 Custody rights came to be seen "not so much as individ-
ual property to be divided between parents, but as a form of social
investment in which custody produced concomitant social duties on
the part of each parent, the performance of which the state could
supervise."3 By 1925, the best interests standard had become a
central part of most custody statutes.36
With time, a doctrine known as "tender years" developed as
courts continuously interpreted the best interests of the child
standard in favor of mothers. 37 The "tender years" doctrine was
essentially "a legal presumption that directed the placement of
children younger than seven - children of tender years - with their
mothers, unless their mothers were 'unfit' to provide care."3 The
Industrial Revolution coupled with increasing sexual division of
labor resulted in Victorian women being viewed as the "idealized
protectors of children, family life and familial values .... ,3 Other
developments that encouraged the growth of a maternal preference
in custody in the nineteenth century included the separation of
home and workplace, which resulted from the move to a more urban
31. See Elkin, supra note 27, at 19 (noting that in Roman times a father's rights to
control his child included the right to sell the child or condemn it to death). See generally,
MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD
CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-47 (1994).
32. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change
in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 737 (1988). See also MASON, supra
note 31, at 58.
33. See generally Redwine, supra note 2, at 714; Fineman, supra note 32, at 737.
34. See Fineman, supra note 32, at 737.
35. Id.
36. See Elkin, supra note 27, at 19.
37. Specifically, in 1839 the preference for fathers was modified by the English
Parliament when it passed the Talfourd Act, which "gave mothers the right to custody of
children under the age of seven." Thus, the Talfourd Act was the "beginning of the 'tender
years' presumption." Elkin, supra note 27, at 19. See generally MASON, supra note 31 at 61-
62.
38. Fineman, supra note 32, at 738.
39. Dianne Trombetta, Joint Custody: Recent Research and Overloaded Courtrooms
Inspire New Solutions to Custody Disputes, 19 J. FAM. L. 213, 215 (1980-81).
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society and the specialization of parental responsibilities. °
Describing why a woman was entitled to custody of her young child,
one court in 1938 wrote "[t]here is but a twilight zone between a
mother's love and the atmosphere of heaven, and all things being
equal, no child should be deprived of that maternal influence.'
As a result of the "tender years" doctrine, women until recently
were awarded sole custody of their children by courts almost
automatically. This practice of nearly excluding fathers from
playing a central role in post-divorce child-rearing was probably the
result of several influences, including "the combined influences of
psychoanalytic theory, maternal deprivation research and the
continued division of sex roles .... ,42 In the 1970s, however, a
movement of fathers seeking greater input into custody determina-
tions began to speak out against such influences and the status of
custody law generally.4 a In the last decade, courts and legislatures
have grown more reluctant to grant maternal sole custody almost
automatically, as evidenced by the growing number of states with
a presumption of joint custody.44 Despite increased consideration
of fathers in custody arrangements, however, in the thirty years
between 1960 and 1990 "[m]ore children were in the sole custody of
their mothers than at any other time in American history ....
States in recent years have made formidable attempts to
change family and child custody law. Several states that have
recently passed legislation supporting a presumption or preference
of joint custody, for example, have accompanied this legislation with
other child custody provisions. To illustrate, Texas recently passed
a family law bill creating a presumption that joint custody is in the
best interests of the child.46 The Texas law contains a requirement
40. See Elkin, supra note 27, at 19.
41. Trombetta, supra note 39, at 215 (quoting Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo.
App. 1938)). See also Redwine, supra note 2, at 714.
42. Trombetta, supra note 39, at 215.
43. See Fineman, supra note 32, at 738. See also Elkin, supra note 27, at 19.
44. See Goldberg, supra note 21, at 50. See also RICHARD A. MARAFIOTE, THE CUSTODY
OF CHILDREN: A BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT MODEL 23 (1985) (commenting that growing
arguments challenging maternal sole custody included "pressure from fathers' rights groups,
an increase in the number of fathers who seek custody, and evidence that the father's role
in child development is significant) (citation omitted).
45. MASON, supra note 31, at 160. Mason notes that the increased numbers of maternal
sole custody households is due to a number of diverse factors, including divorce and
illegitimacy. See id.
46. See Texas Passes Presumptive Joint Custody; Makes Numerous Other Changes in
Law, SPEAK OUT FOR CHILDREN (Q. Newsl. of Children's Rights Council, Inc.), Summer, 1995,
at 1 [hereinafter Texas Passes Presumptive Joint Custody]. See also Presumption for Joint
Custody, supra note 20, at 1. A new law for the District of Columbia states: "[Tihere shall
be a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child or children."
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for parents to make a "good faith" effort to solve their custody
disputes through mediation and a provision making it easier to
shift custody from one parent to another in sole custody settings.47
Also, although individual state law governs specific custody provi-
sions, the federal government has expressed concern about increas-
ing the strength of families and has stressed the importance of the
role of committed fathers in the American family.
On June 16, 1995, for example, President Clinton issued a
memorandum to the federal departments and agencies which have
programs and policies affecting the family.48 In this memorandum,
President Clinton ordered all federal offices to "review every
program, policy, and initiative (hereinafter referred to collectively
as 'programs') that pertains to families to ... proactively modify
those programs that were designed to serve primarily mothers and
children, where appropriate and consistent with program objectives,
to explicitly include fathers and strengthen their involvement with
their children. . . ." Notably, the President's memorandum did
not include a suggestion of directives to encourage joint custody.
The concern of the federal government in strengthening the role of
fathers in the lives of their children is reflected in new state legis-
lation' which seeks to modify the singular role mothers have
played in custody arrangements. The federal initiative may influ-
ence state legislatures most, however, by encouraging father's
rights groups lobbying for changes in state law.
C. Types of Custody Laws Available Today
Varied approaches to custody decisions have evolved as a result
of rising divorce rates and increases in the number of custody
Id. It also includes, among other things,:
[seventeen] factors that a court must consider in making a joint or sole custody
determination; requires each parent to submit a detailed parenting plan
regarding the allocation of rights and responsibilities of each parent; provides
that an objection by one parent to any custody arrangement shall not be the
sole basis for refusing the entry of an order for the custody arrangement... in
the best interest of the child.
Id.
47. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.102-107 (West 1997)
48. See White House Publishes Memo Supporting Fathers, SPEAK OUT FOR CHILDREN,
supra note 46, at 5 (reprinting Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies entitled "Supporting the Role of Fathers in Families").
49. MEMORANDUM ON SUPPORTING THE ROLE OF FATHERS IN FAMILIES, 1 PUB. PAPERS,
899-900 (June 16, 1995).
50. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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decisions made each year.51 With regard to joint custody, statutes
may include a rebuttable presumption of joint custody, a preference
for joint custody, an option of joint custody, or simply direct judges
to order the custody arrangement in the best interests of the child.52
A presumption of joint custody generally directs that joint
custody, whether physical or legal, should be ordered by judges in
most cases, provided there is not a compelling reason to deny such
an arrangement.5 3 The presumption does not necessarily mean that
joint custody will be ordered but, rather, is a starting point for
judges and parents alike. Should one parent choose to relinquish
custody, for example, or where both parents agree that sole custody
is preferable to joint custody, joint custody will generally not be
ordered by the court.54 In addition, where for some other reason
joint custody is shown to be not in the best interests of the child, the
presumption may be overcome.55 Unlike statutes with a presump-
tion of joint custody, statutes establishing a preference for joint
custody may merely require courts to consider joint custody, or may
require the court to state its reasons for denying an award of joint
custody. 6
Custody statutes without a presumption of or preference for
joint custody often direct judges to determine the custody arrange-
ment that is in the best interests of the child, whether this be joint
custody, sole custody, or some other alternative form of custody."7
No statutes indicate a presumption other than one for joint custody.
A strong preference for maternal sole custody may exist in states
such as Virginia, however, through custom resulting from case
law.58 Courts in states without a presumption of joint custody
consider a number of factors to determine the arrangement in the
best interests of the child. Generally accepted criteria include: the
nurturing character of the caretaker; the use of reasonable disci-
pline by the caretaker; the absence of physical abuse of the child;
the mental stability of the caretaker; time available for the child;
51. See MASON, supra note 31, at 129.
52. See generally infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text. See also Folberg, supra note
3, at 9 ('These legislative enactments run the gamut from simply recognizing the legality of
joint custody orders to creating a strong presumption favoring joint custody whether or not
the parents agree and requiring judicial findings if joint custody is not decreed.").
53. See Joanne Schulmann & Valerie Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Custody: Analysis
of Legislation and its Implications for Women and Children, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED
PARENTING, supra note 3, at 209, 213.
54. See Trombetta, supra note 39, at 232.
55. See Schulmann & Pitt, supra note 53, at 214.
56. See id. at 210-14.
57. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (Michie 1950).
58. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, VIRGINIA DOMESTIC RELATIONS HANDBOOK 364-65 (1996).
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continuous rather than intermittent care-taking in the past; and
the stability of home life offered by the caretaker. 59
Under current law, courts in Virginia are guided by nine factors
used to determine what custody situation is in the best interests of
the child. These criteria include the following:
1. The age and physical and mental condition of the child,
giving due consideration to the child's changing developmental
needs; 2. The age and physical and mental condition of each
parent; 3. The relationship existing between each parent and
each child, giving due consideration to the positive involvement
with the child's life... ; 4. The needs of the child, giving due
consideration to other important relationships of the child,
including but not limited to siblings, peers and extended family
members; 5. The role which each parent has played and will
play in the future, in the upbringing and care of the child; 6.
The propensity of each parent to actively support the child's
contact and relationship with the other parent ... ; 7. The
reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of reasonable intelligence, understanding, age and
experience to express such a preference; 8. Any history of
family abuse... ; and 9. Such other factors as the court deems
necessary and proper to the determination.'
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILD CUSTODY LAWS THROUGH
VIRGINIA CASE LAW
Understanding child custody law requires review of its histor-
ical development through case law. From the earliest custody cases
in Virginia emerged several basic principles upon which modern
custody jurisprudence in the state is founded."' The central role of
the welfare of the child in custody disputes, for example, is
reaffirmed in case after case throughout the history of child custody
law in Virginia.62 Early cases also announced doctrines which have
59. See Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the
Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 26 (1986).
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Michie 1950).
61. The oldest reported case in Virginia determining custody issues is Carr v. Carr, 63
Va. (22 Gratt.) 168 (1872). See also Shockey v. Shockey, 30 Va. Cir. 493, 494 (1979). For an
excellent summary of Virginia case law related to child custody, see BRIEN A. ROCHE,
VIRGINIA DOMEsTIc RELATIONS CASE FINDER (1996).
62. For example, early cases refer to "having in view the good of the child." Carr, 63 Va.
(22 Gratt.) at 174. Numerous cases cite the rule that the "welfare of the infant is the
primary, paramount, and controlling consideration of the court in all controversies between
parents over the custody of their minor children." BRINIG, supra note 58, at 363 (citing
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ultimately given way to standards more reflective of present con-
ditions in society, such as the twentieth century shift away from the
property right of fathers in their children to a presumptive right of
maternal custody of a child of tender years. 3
Courts of the nineteenth century looked to English common law
for guidance in determining how the property right of a father in his
children should be recognized in custody disputes. 4 Early common
law of England held that the father had an absolute right to the
custody of his children and upon divorce could deny the mother all
access to, or communication with, his children.65 This harsh doc-
trine was later modified by statutes which, although continuing to
recognize the father's property right in the child as "high and
sacred," looked above all to the interests of the child.' The court in
Latham v. Latham noted the similarity between the law in Virginia
in 1878 and that of England:
The father is the legal guardian of the infant; the law gives it to
him against all the world. The right of the father (say all the
cases) to the custody of his legitimate minor children, of
whatever age they may be, is perfectly clear - too well settled to
admit of dispute."
Despite the focus of Virginia courts in the nineteenth century
on the rights of fathers to custody of their children in the event of
divorce,68 the interests of the child were increasingly being recog-
nized as worthy of consideration.69 A court in 1872 rendered its
Mullen v. Mullen, 49 S.E.2d 349, 354 (Va. 1948)). See aso Burnside v. Burnside, 222 S.E.2d
529, 530 (Va. 1976); Durrette v. Durrette, 288 S.E.2d 432 (Va. 1982).
63. See Trombetta, supra note 39. Cf. Latham v. Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 307, 331
(1878) (affirming the right of the father as legal custodian of the child). See also Mullen, 49
S.E.2d at 354 (stating the mother is the natural custodian of a child of tender years).
64. See Mary Kate Kearney, The New Paradigm in Custody Law: Looking at Parents with
a Loving Eye, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 547 (1996).
65. See BRINIG, supra note 58, at 364 (citing Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) at 331). See also
ROCHE, supra note 61, at 104 (summarizing the holding in Latham to be that "[flather is
legal custodian of minor children and they will not be taken from him without strongest
reasons").
66. Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) at 331-32.
67. Id. at 331. An illegitimate child, however, was more readily given to its mother. See
BRINIG, supra note 58, at 366.
68. The weight accorded fathers in custody determinations was stated in the case of
Coffee and Wife v. Black, 82 Va. 567, 569 (1886): "The father is entitled to the custody of his
child, when he is a fit and suitable person, and when he has not voluntarily relinquished it."
Id.
69. See Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) at 332. Other states at this time, such as New York,
Ohio, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and "indeed in most of the states," had statutes creating
a rebuttable presumption of custody in favor of the father. Id. at 333-35.
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decision "having in view the good of the child."7 ° Likewise, the court
in Latham acknowledged the potential for the interests of the child
to overcome the property interest of a father in the child. The court
stated that "[t]he father is universally considered as having claims
paramount to those of the mother, his legal authority only yielding
to the claims of the infant, whenever the morals or interests of the
latter strongly require it."' By 1886, the interests of the child were
held to prevail at least over the claims of a father who had volun-
tarily relinquished his legal right to custody. 72 In Coffee and Wife
v. Black, the court stated that in such cases, "the welfare of the
infant, and not the rights of the parent, is the polar star by which
the discretion of the court is guided in awarding the custody of the
infant. 7 1 The child's interests, as central in all circumstances,
became a fundamental principle in Virginia child custody jurispru-
dence, recognized wholeheartedly in the 1948 benchmark case of
Mullen v. Mullen.74 The Mullen court stated, "[iln Virginia, we have
established the rule that the welfare of the infant is the primary,
paramount, and controlling consideration of the court in all con-
troversies between parents over the custody of their minor children.
All other matters are subordinate. 75
Like the increased recognition of the interests of the child, the
"tender years" doctrine played a fundamental role in custody law in
Virginia. In the earliest Virginia cases, the custody of a female
child of tender years might be granted to its mother, while a male
child of presumably the same age would not:
When the child is a daughter of very tender years, and the
mother is deemed a suitable person, the custody is given to her,
as essential to the health and life of the infant; while in
conformity with the English rule the male child is given to the
father, except in very extreme cases.76
70. Carr v. Carr, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 168, 174 (1872) (granting custody of a four-year-old
female child to its father after the mother apparently abandoned her husband without
sufficient cause).
71. Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) at 332.
72. See Coffee and Wife v. Black, 82 Va. 567, 569 (1886)).
73.. Coffee and Wife, 82 Va. at 569.
74. 49 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1948).
75. Id. at 354. The Mullen court cited other Virginia case recognizing the best interests
of the child: Stringfellow v. Somerville, 29 S.E. 685 (Va. 1898); Parrish v. Parrish, 82 S.E. 119
(Va. 1914); Fleshood v. Fleshood, 130 S.E. 648 (Va. 1927); Markley v. Markley, 134 S.E. 536
(Va. 1926); Darnell v. Barker, 18 S.E.2d 271 (Va. 1942); Elam v. Elam, 29 S.E.2d 222 (Va.
1944). Id.
76. Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) at 333.
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Other judges of this time believed that young children of both
genders are best served in the custody of their mothers. Contrary
to the contemporary standard set out in Carr,7 the dissent in
Latham argued that children are best cared for by their mothers
wh6have a God-given duty and responsibility to care for them.78 By
1899, the proposition that a mother should be granted custody of
her children of tender years, regardless of gender, was well estab-
lished. 9
Over time, the mother, rather than the father, of a child of
tender years was recognized as the rightful custodian in a custody
dispute, provided she was fit and all other things were equal."0
Accordingly, the court in the 1948 benchmark case of Mullen v.
Mullen held:
It is now generally recognized that the mother is the natural
custodian of her child of tender years, and that if she is a fit and
proper person, other things being equal, she should be given the
custody in order that the child may receive the attention, care,
supervision, and kindly advice, which arise from a mother's love
and devotion, for which no substitute has ever been found.
Human experience supports the policy that young children
should not be deprived of the care of their mothers and of their
love and tenderness, which may be counted upon most unfail-
ingly.... Accordingly, it has been held that children of tender
age, especially girls, will be awarded to their mothers, if fit and
suitable; and that where no injury or disadvantage will result
to the child, the feelings of the maternal parent must be given
consideration. 81
77. See Carr v. Carr, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 168, 174 (1872) (holding that a father was
necessarily the best caretaker during the ages for moral training and impression).
78. The court stated:
The training and instruction of the children in early life, and during the period
when their characters are being formed, properly devolves on the mother....
This is the peculiar province of the mother; it is the position wherein God
placed her, and she is responsible to Him for the manner in which she
discharges the duty.
Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) at 388.
79. See Trimble v. Trimble, 97 Va. 217, 220 (1899) (The court held that the mother has
absolute rights of custody of her seven-month-old child of tender years. "No argument is
required to show that the mother is the proper custodian of a child of that age.").
80. See BRINIG, supra note 58, at 364 (citing Mullen v. Mullen, 49 S.E.2d 349, 354 (Va.
1948)). See also, ROCHE, supra note 61, at 107-10.
81. Mullen, 49 S.E.2d at 354.
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Despite statutory language in the Virginia Code stating no
presumption of custody to either parent, 2 a tender years "presump-
tion" for mothers was widely cited as a rule of law in Virginia cases
until at least 1971.83 It was not until the 1976 case of Harper v.
Harper that the court finally applied the plain language of the
statutory law, which the court noted "expressly states that there
shall be no presumption of law in favor of either parent."84 There
the court held the conclusion of Moore v. Moore, 5 a 1971 case which
held mothers to be the natural custodians of their children of tender
years, not to be a rule of law. Instead, in the face of substantial
precedent, the court concluded the tender years presumption to be,
at best, a rebuttable inference: "At most the principle for which
Moore stands is no more than a permissible and rebuttable infe-
rence, that when the mother is fit, and other things are equal, she,
as the natural custodian, should have custody of a child of tender
years."86 Another case, in 1976, similarly held that the tender years
doctrine is flexible, and is not to be applied without regard to sur-
rounding circumstances.87
Even following Harper, however, courts in Virginia continued
to enforce some form of tender years inference in favor of mothers.
82. In the 1970 case of Hall v. Hall, the court, in passing, referred to a section of the
Virginia Code providing that, "as between parents there shall be no presumption of law in
favor of either parent." 173 S.E.2d 865, 868 (Va. 1970) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 31-15 (Michie
1950)).
83. See, e.g., DeMott v. DeMott, 92 S.E.2d 342, 347 (Va. 1956) ("As respects the custody
of a young daughter, other things being equal, the law favors the mother if she is a fit
person.'); Brooks v. Brooks, 106 S.E.2d 611, 617-18 (Va. 1959) ("Generally, where the child
is of tender years and will be equally well cared for by either the mother or father, the
mother, in preference to the father, should be awarded its custody."); Campbell v. Campbell
122 S.E.2d 658, 660 (Va. 1961) (The mother is the natural custodian of her children of tender
years, and if she is a proper person, other things being equal, the law favors awarding her
their custody .... "); Moore v. Moore, 183 S.E.2d 172, 174 (Va. 1971) ('CThe mother is
universally recognized as the natural guardian and custodian of her children of tender years
and if she is a fit and proper person, other things being equal, it is the settled practice in this
State to award their custody, especially girls, to the mother.'). See also ROCHE, supra note
61, at 109.
84. Harper v. Harper, 229 S.E.2d 875, 877 (Va. 1976).
85. 183 S.E.2d 172 (Va. 1971).
86. Harper, 229 S.E.2d at 877. See also Clark v. Clark, 234 S.E.2d 266 (Va. 1977)
(holding that although no initial presumption favoring either parent exists, there is a
permissible inference that when all things are equal, custody of children of tender years
should be given to the mother).
87. See Burnside v. Burnside, 222 S.E.2d 529, 530 (Va. 1976). Applying the tender years
doctrine in light of the statute indicating that as between parents there shall be no
presumption in favor of either, the court stated: "Even though the mother... might not be
unfit, the child's Welfare must not be adversely affected for the sake of a mechanical rule,
which blindly accepted would require the award of his custody to his mother." Id. at 531
(citation omitted).
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In the 1977 case of McCreery v. McCreery, for example, the court
held that the tender years doctrine still applied in Virginia but
described it as an "inference":
The "presumption" is, in fact, an inference society has drawn
that such right [of the child] is best served when a child of
tender years is awarded the custodial care of its mother....
And that inference controls unless, in a particular case, it is
overcome by evidence that the right of the child will be better
served by awarding the child the custodial care of its father. By
definition, the inference controls only when the evidence shows
that the mother is fit and "other things"8 affecting the child's
welfare are equal.89
Employing the tender years inference outlined in McCreery,
later courts used a two-fold analysis to decide custody.9' First, they
determined whether both parents were fit to have custody.9 If
either parent was not found fit, custody was awarded to the fit
parent. If, however, both parents were deemed fit, the court
considered whether "all other things"92 were equal. Only if the two
home environments were found to be equal, did the inference arise
that the mother should have custody of children of tender years.93
The formal tender years inference in favor of mothers was
short-lived. Immediately following application of the tender years
inference in the Durrette case in 1982, the General Assembly
amended section 31-15 of the Virginia Code.94 Prior to this amend-
ment in 1983, the Code had stated "... there shall be no presump-
88. The court defined these "other things" affecting the child's welfare as "things which
affect the quality of the custodial care received by the child." McCreery v. McCreery, 237
S.E.2d 167, 169 (Va. 1977).
89. McCreery, 237 S.E.2d. at 168.
90. See Leisge v. Leisge, 292 S.E.2d 352 (Va. 1982).
91. See, e.g., Mullen v. Mullen, 49 S.E.2d 349, 354 (Va. 1948) (defining the elements
necessary to determine the fitness of the parents in regard to the welfare of the child to
include: the adaptability of the parent to the task of caring for the child; controlling and
directing the child; the age, sex, and health of the child as well as its "temporal and moral
wellbeing"; the environment and circumstances of the proposed home; and the influences
likely to be exerted upon the child'). These factors were eventually codified in the Virginia
Code. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
92. See Durrette v. Durrette, 288 S.E.2d 432 (Va. 1982) (including suitability of the
parents' respective homes as among the "other things" to be considered). Suitability of the
home was not determined merely by comparing physical accommodations or material
advantages. See id.
93. See, e.g., Leisge, 292 S.E.2d at 354-55.
94. See Visikides v. Derr, 348 S.E.2d 40, 42 (Va. App. 1986) (denying the existence of a
"tender years" inference).
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situations. One study has shown, for example, that relitigation of
custody status for joint custody families was one-half that of sole
custody families.1"' The authors of the study concluded that joint
custody was more beneficial than sole custody because of reduced
parental conflict in the joint custody setting." 2 These findings are
corroborated by another study which concluded that joint custody
families engaged in much less relitigation than single custody
families, finding that fifty-six percent of the sole custody parents
had returned to court at least once subsequent to the initial custody
order. 10 3 By contrast, none of the joint custody families in the study
relitigated. 1 4 It is possible, however, that joint custody families
relitigate less often than sole custody families not because of the
custody arrangements themselves, but because courts award joint
custody to parents more able to cooperate without court supervi-
sion. °5 Perhaps awards on such a basis would predispose these
families to less litigation.
Another purported advantage of joint custody arrangements is
that fathers with joint custody tend to pay child support with more
consistency than do fathers in circumstances where the mother is
the sole custodian."° Researchers have found that only half of sin-
gle custody mothers receive reliable child support from their ex-
spouse.' 7 Why increased reliability of financial support occurs in
joint custody settings is unknown, but researchers have postulated
that joint custody fathers continue to pay support because they feel
more involved with their children.' s A positive relationship be-
tween access to children and payment of child support is revealed
in statistics published by the United States Census Bureau in
1991.'m These statistics reveal that joint custody fathers pay 90.2%
of their child support whereas fathers with neither joint custody nor
visitation make payments of only 44.5% of their child support."0
Although the effects on children of any custody arrangement
must be of primary concern, the custodial parent's satisfaction is
101. See Ilfeld, Jr. et al., supra note 23, at 65.
102. See id.
103. See Deborah Anna Luepnitz, A Comparison of Maternal, Paternal, and Joint Custody:
Understanding the Varieties of Post-Divorce Family Life, 9 J. DIVORCE 1, 5 (1986).
104. See id.
105. See id. at 6.
106. See Kelly, supra note 27, at 133.
107. See Luepnitz, supra note 103, at 6.
108. See id.
109. See The Relationship Between Child Support and Access, SPEAK OUT FOR CHILDREN,
supra note 46, at 9 (citing GORDON H. LESTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No.
173, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1989 (1991)).
110. See id.
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tion of law in favor of either [parent]."" The year following
Durrette, the General Assembly amended the Code to read "...
there shall be no presumption or inference of law in favor of either
[parent] ."96 In interpreting these changes to the statute, the court
in Visikides v. Derr held the use of any such tender years inference
in determining what is in the best interests of the child to be
reversible error.
97
Although the tender years inference of maternal custody stated
in the 1948 Mullen case is no longer quoted as a rule of law by
Virginia courts today, the case remains important because it states
the basic guiding principle for determination of child custody cases
which has endured: the best interests of the child. 8 Without a
formal tender years presumption or inference in favor of either
parent, Virginia courts in the 1990s and beyond must strive to
reexamine and refine what is truly in the best interests of the child.
IV. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF JOINT CUSTODY
ARRANGEMENTS
Research on custody arrangements has resulted in mixed
conclusions regarding joint custody's effect on the welfare of
children and the advisability of joint custody presumptions.99
Stemming from a variety of scientific limitations "[t]he resultant
intermingling of sound data, unreliable data, clinical observation,
social myth, and unsubstantiated or irrelevant theory has created
confusion, strongly voiced opinion, and unevenness in information
available to parents, clinicians, schools, lawyers, courts, and the
media."'00 Any review of psychological research on the effects of
joint custody arrangements, therefore, must be performed with
caution.
An argument in favor of promoting a presumption of joint
custody is that families with joint custody arrangements tend to
relitigate their arrangement less than parents in sole custody
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-15 (Michie 1950).
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-15 (Michie 1985) (emphasis added).
97. See Visikides, 348 S.E.2d at 42.
98. See Mullen v. Mullen, 49 S.E.2d 349, 354 (Va. 1948). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 31-15
(Michie 1950) (providing that where parents are separated, the court "in awarding the
custody of the child to either parent or to some other person, shall give primary consideration
to the welfare of the child .. ).
99. See Kline, supra note 23, at 430 (noting that "the scarcity of studies that evaluate
children living in different types of custody situations and the exclusive focus on short-term
outcomes have advanced only slightly our knowledge about the nature of joint physical
custody and its impact on children").
100. Kelly, supra note 27, at 120.
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also a consideration in drafting new custody laws. Parents with
joint physical custody have experienced "high levels of satisfaction"
with the arrangement,"' but "[p]arents with court-ordered joint
custody reported being less satisfied than parents voluntarily enter-
ing into joint custody, and spouses reporting high levels of marital
conflict tended to be less satisfied as well with their joint custody
situation.""' 2 Parents in non-custodial positions, on the other hand,
have demonstrated greater difficulty in adjusting to life after
divorce. As a result of not gaining custody, such parents must
confront the loss of familiar activities and may encounter great
lifestyle changes as well." 3 A greater feeling of continuity, due to
the presence of the child, may exist for the custodial parent."4 Such
continuity is unavailable to the non-custodial parent who in turn
may face feelings such as depression and guilt." 5 Other benefits to
parents of joint custody include a wider variety of child care options
and a greater opportunity to escape burn-out from parenting.
1 6
Thus, increased options for child care may exist in joint custody
arrangements where parents can rely on one another for substitute
care."
7
Despite greater parental satisfaction with joint custody in some
settings, sole custody may be more advantageous for parents and
children when protracted levels of conflict exist between parents.
A child's adjustment to joint custody may be impaired when sub-
jected to a high degree of conflict between his or her parents."' Al-
though the percentage of parents who continue to express hostility
toward their former spouse after divorce may only be approximated,
one study reported that "[o]nly [twenty percent] of the parents be-
lieved that they could cooperate 'not at all' or 'very little' regarding
their children at final divorce (an average of 20 months after separ-
ation).""' 9 This significant percentage should not be ignored. Con-
tinued conflict between parents could render joint custody unaccept-
able to parents and children alike.
111. Kelly, supra note 27, at 133 (citations omitted).
112. Id. (citing Irving et al., Shared Parenting, 23 FAM. PROCESS 561-569 (1984)).
113. See Trombetta, supra note 39, at 220-21 (citations omitted).
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See Luepnitz, supra note 103, at 6-7.
117. See id.
118. See Kelly, supra note 27, at 131.
119. Id. at 125 (citing Irving et al., supra note 112).
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Joint custody arrangements have the potential to increase the
independence of women,12 ° but may also foster increased depend-
ence on the former spouse as well.12" ' Parents in joint legal custody
arrangements must make major decisions jointly with regard to the
child, which may create opportunities for the more aggressive
parent to manipulate the weaker one.'22 In joint physical custody
situations, the opportunity for continued control, manipulation and
abuse is even greater: 2 3 "where physical custody is equalized,
frequent contacts between parents are likely, as children are
transferred from one parent to the other .... Thus, a spouse who
was manipulated during the marriage will continue to be subject to
influence and power after divorce."'24
More detrimental than possible continued control of women by
their former spouses, statutes which promote joint custody may also
allow fathers of children to continue to abuse their former
spouses. 2 ' This continued contact may "disable some women from
emerging from destructive and dependent relationships with their
former husbands."'26 Courts may or may not take into account
spousal abuse when deciding custody arrangements - abuse to a
child, however, will often be taken into account.2 7 Judges may not,
however, always equate wife abuse with unfitness as a father.'28
Much has been written on the negative effects of divorce on
children. Worry over lack of contact with one parent is among the
most common reactions of children to divorce, which also include:
"intense anxiety about their future well-being and caretaking, sad-
ness and acute reactive depressions, [and] increased anger .... ,,129
120. See Bartlett & Stack, supra note 59, at 17 (noting that joint custody, "may force
women to give up some of the control and power they exercise over their children, and
autonomy and self-definition derived from their status as mothers, but it may also free them
from a dependency which may stifle women as well as their children'). Bartlett and Stack
ultimately concluded that dependency and oppression of women through joint custody
arrangements is not a satisfactory reason to reject joint custody. See id. at 26-27.
121. See Bartlett & Stack, supra note 59, at 9.
122. See id. at 20.
123. See, e.g., Luepnitz, supra note 103, at 7 (describing sole custody for the abused women
in this study as allowing them "to be free of these battering men in a way that joint custody
would not").
124. Bartlett & Stack, supra note 59, at 20.
125. See Luepnitz, supra note 103, at 10 (stating that up to 50% of all women will be
battered at some point by a man who is important in their life).
126. Bartlett & Stack, supra note 59, at 14.
127. See Luepnitz, supra note 103, at 10.
128. See id. (citing In re Abdullah, 400 N.E.2d 1063 (Ill. 1980) (granting custody (later
revoked on appeal) of a six-year-old boy to his father who had been convicted of murdering
the boy's mother)).
129. Kelly, supra note 27, at 122.
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A study of children in sole custody found that loss of contact with
one parent may produce destructive feelings in children who remain
in contact with the non-custodial parent primarily through
visitation:130
The traditional visiting pattern of every other weekend, most
often a maximum of four overnights spent with the father per
month, created intense dissatisfaction among children, and
especially young boys. Youngsters expressed profound feelings
of deprivation and loss, and reactive depressions were fre-
quently observed in young school-aged boys. 13'
As a result of such dissatisfaction with visitation, ' 32"paternal drop-
out" may occur more frequently in sole custody arrangements than
in joint custody situations. "Paternal drop-out" refers to the
decreased contact with the non-custodial father that a child may
experience especially in the first two years after separation.133
Children in the sole custody of their mothers have been shown to be
significantly more likely than children in joint custody to experience
the effects of "paternal drop-out."' 34 Research on children in joint
custody arrangements, in contrast, describes these children as
feeling close to both parents and not suffering from the deep sense
of loss more common with children in sole custody situations. 135
The children in joint custody describe "a sense of being loved by
both parents and report[] feeling strongly attached to two psycho-
130. See id. at 137 (noting that restrictive visitation schedules may eventually destroy a
father's relationship with his children). See also Trombetta, supra note 39, at 217 (citing J.
Greif, Fathers, Children and Joint Custody, paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Orthopsychiatric Association, San Francisco (1978) (finding limited visitation by
the noncustodial parent severely restricts the opportunity to provide daily nurturing and
comfort needed to strengthen the relationship)).
131. Kelly, aupra note 27, at 127 (citing J. WALLERSTEIN & J.B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980)). See also Greif, supra
note 130, at 7 (finding that children in single custody situations are likely to develop fan-
tasized image of absent or noncustodial parent); Kline et al., supra note 23, at 430 ("Research
has repeatedly indicated that living in single-parent homes, with concomitant father
absences, is deleterious for the postdivorce behavioral and emotional adjustment of
children.").
132. The United States Census Bureau in 1991 reported that as of Spring 1990, 54.9% of
fathers had visitation privileges; only 7.3% had joint custody of their children; and the
remaining 37.8% enjoyed neither joint custody or visitation rights. See The Relationship
Between Child Support and Access, supra note 109, at 1.
133. See Kelly, supra note 27, at 131 (citations omitted).
134. See id. at 128 (citing Kline et al., A Rose By Any Other Name: Children's Adjustment
in Joint and Sole Physical Custody Families, paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Orthopsychiatry Association, San Francisco (1988)).
135. See id. at 131.
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logical parents, in contrast to feeling close to just one primary
parent." '136
Access to both parents, however, does not necessarily guarantee
a smooth adjustment for children following the divorce of their
parents. Frequent visitation with a non-custodial father may yield
a neutral effect "neither foster[ing] nor hinder[ing] child behavioral
and emotional adjustment. 137 Other studies have shown no differ-
ences in experiences and feelings of children in sole custody situa-
tions compared to those in joint custody arrangements.138 Kline
found, for example, that custody and access arrangements do not
play a major role in the complex family process which affects a
child's development:'
39
Despite having more access to both parents, joint custody
children show neither less disturbance nor better social and
emotional adjustment after divorce than sole custody children.
The finding that custody type is not predictive of child outcome
is consistent with recent reports of no differences found in
behavioral adjustment between children living in joint physical
custody or joint legal custody and children living in sole custody
arrangements. These results also support findings that
paternal access is unrelated to the adjustment of children living
in divorced families. 4 0
Notwithstanding studies showing that children of divorce have
a greater tendency toward behavioral problems than do children of
intact families,14 ' sole custody is not necessarily negative and
should by no means be abandoned as a viable option in family law.
Children of single-parent homes constitute a "substantial popula-
tion of youngsters . . . who are well adjusted in their social,
academic, and psychological behaviors.' 42 Further, studies of the
psychological impact of custody arrangements have produced mixed
136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. Kline et al., supra note 23, at 430 (citing F. Furstenberg et al., Paternal Participation
and Children's Well-Being After Marital Dissolution, 52 AM. Soc. REV. 695-701 (1987)).
138. See Kline et al., supra note 23, at 430.
139. See id. at 436.
140. Id. at 435 (citations omitted).
141. See id. at 437. Kline highlights that the conclusions of all psychological studies
should be noted with caution, including Kline's finding that custody arrangements are not
dispositive of the psychological adjustment of a child. Noted in the study is the caveat that
loss of the father following divorce was not assessed and that such a loss has been found to
be a primary cause of distress in children undergoing such circumstances. See id.
142. Kelly, supra note 27, at 125 (citations omitted).
IMPROVING CUSTODY LAW IN VIRGINIA
results."' For example, research has shown children in joint custo-
dy arrangements to have increased self-esteem, but a "substantial
portion of [joint custody] children were visibly distressed and con-
fused."144
In sum, joint custody arrangements may reduce tension experi-
enced by children of divorcing couples, provided that the couple is
not one predisposed to conflict and especially if the joint custody
arrangement is voluntary. Joint custody may also result in
increased payment of child support, at least in those settings where
increased parental involvement is a result. Research addressing
the advantages of different custody arrangements on the psycholog-
ical adjustment of children, however, appears to have mixed results.
Such varied conclusions may suggest that custody arrangements
are highly individual and must be tailored to each divorcing family's
needs. Because neither joint custody nor sole custody appears to be
a panacea for children of divorce, legislators should be cautious in
implementing any legislation which imposes one type of arrange-
ment to the detrimental exclusion of the other.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE FOR VIRGINIA IN LIEU OF A PRESUMPTION OF
JOINT CUSTODY
Legislators seeking to adjust child custody law in Virginia
should maintain the "best interests of the child" standard while
amending the law to better reflect current research indicating the
benefits of joint custody. Changes should seek to reduce gender
bias in custody decisions thereby resulting in more post-divorce
two-parent involvement with children. Until research shows defini-
tively and repeatedly that joint custody or sole custody is a superior
choice in nearly all divorces, no presumptive custody arrangements,
whether joint or sole, should be adopted. To adopt a presumption,
even when rebuttable, would be to invite a repetition of the same
inequalities and gender biases that have historically plagued child
custody law in this country.
The "best interests" test and its accompanying factors should
not be interpreted as inviting a choice between parents. Joint legal
or physical custody may very well be in the best interests of the
child. Under no circumstances should children again be viewed as
property, subject to a presumed equal division between parents.
Instead, new legislation should not impose joint custody on parents
143. See Kline et al., supra note 23, at 430.
144. Id.
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unwilling or unable to accommodate such an order,1 45 any more
than sole custody should be used to force one parent out of the
parenting role. Refining the best interests standard, rather than
rejecting it, should be the direction taken by legislators.
The current best interests standard in Virginia has the benefit
of clear statutory language and a list of factors to aid courts in
custody determinations. 146 To provide the best custody situation
possible for the post-divorce family, the Virginia legislature should
make specific additions to the list of factors used to determine
custody. The statute should be modified to include: 1) mandatory
consideration of an arrangement of joint custody and, 2) a specific
statement denouncing the use of gender-bias in custody determina-
tions.
A. Include Mandatory Consideration of Joint Custody in the Best
Interests Factors
Virginia legislators should amend the list of factors to include
mandatory consideration of joint custody as proposed in the
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to Senate Bill 496.14' The
statute should also explicitly state that joint custody is not to be
presumed. Courts would remain free to implement a custody
determination tailored to each unique family situation, but would
be required to formally consider a variety of custody arrangements
including joint custody. As part of their formal consideration,
Virginia judges should be required to account for their consideration
of each possible custody arrangement in their final custody
decisions. 141 Mandatory consideration of joint custody in the "best
interests" factors brings the prospect of joint custody into a more
prominent position in the custody arena, without denying the
opportunity for other best interests factors to outweigh a prelimi-
nary determination of joint custody. A strict presumption of joint
custody with exceptions only for situations of abuse or high conflict
145. See Fineman, supra note 32, at 769 ("It is one thing for divorcing parents voluntarily
to choose the shared parenting ideal, but quite another to impose it on parents who do not
or cannot live up to its demands.").
146. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
148. In the 1998 Session of the Virginia General Assembly, Delegate Eric I. Cantor
proposed in HB 1239 that courts should be required to "make written detailed findings as to
each factor in this section [Va. Code Ann. § 20-124.3 (Michie 1950)] and explain how such
factors led to its determination of the parenting arrangements." H.B. 1239, Reg. Sess. (Va.
1998). The bill has been referred to the Committee for Courts of Justice. See H.B. 1239, Reg.
Sess. (Va. 1998), available in WESTLAW, Bill Tracking file.
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would not allow for other more subtle, but still important, "best
interests" factors to overcome a joint custody presumption. When
joint custody must be fully considered by courts but is not legally
presumed, parents will not be forced into a potentially harmful joint
arrangement when the best interests of the child demands an
alternative custody arrangement.
B. Reduce Gender-Bias in Custody Decisions
Courts should be encouraged to reduce gender-bias in making
custody decisions. Such a recommendation is perhaps the most
difficult to enforce because gender-bias is often borne of custom and
tradition, and will likely not be eradicated without intensive aware-
ness campaigns and the passage of time. Increased awareness of
the importance of fair consideration of both father and mother as
continuing custodians, however, is essential to allowing Virginia
courts to retain freedom from custody presumptions. Reduction of
gender-bias may occur over time if judges are more stringently
required to consider alternative custody arrangements.
VI. CONCLUSION
Laws and customs which nearly automatically award custody
of a child to its mother should be examined carefully in light of re-
cent research indicating the benefits to children and to parents of
joint custody, while recognizing that neither arrangement is su-
perior to the other in addressing the divergent needs of all divorcing
couples. Greater incorporation of joint custody options in family
law should not assume joint custody is an "automatic answer" any
more than is a standard award of sole maternal custody.
In its current form, the best interests of the child standard
provides judges with a wide spectrum of custody arrangements from
which to choose. These choices are limited only by statutory
criteria which a judge must assess in determining the child's best
interest as well as by any form of custody arrangement not
permitted by state law. Even more than a preference of joint
custody, a legal presumption of joint custody will narrow the
judicial system's options of deciding what is in the best interests of
the child. 1
49
At its most basic level, a presumption of joint custody may
compel courts to tell parents something akin to the following: "we
149. See Bartlett & Stack, supra note 59, at 26.
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don't care how you feel about each other. As long as there is no
clear, convincing evidence that either of you is abusive and unfit to
be a parent, our assumption is that you are both qualified to
continue as parents, albeit under different circumstances. '150 A
simplistic assessment of a presumption of joint custody, however,,
does not necessarily take into account the degree of fitness of each
parent and his or her past dedication to the child. For example,
[C]ourts have tended to be too easily impressed by the good
intentions of fathers and have exaggerated the credit due them
for their newfound willingness to assume some active role in
parenting .... [At the same time] [c]ourts easily ignore the
career interests of mothers in making custody orders restricting
the geographic location of the children to the place of the
father's current employment.'
A presumption of joint physical custody too easily ignores the past
performance of parents, and may unduly give credence to the once
unavailable parent who upon divorce meets a minimum legal
standard of not being abusive or completely unfit.'52
A presumption of joint custody may equalize the rights of
parents to continue parenting more than a "default rule" of sole
custody. 5 ' The promotion of equal parenting rights, however, must
be weighed against the potential for continued violence against
women from abusive ex-husbands.'54 Violence or "[t]he threat of
violence is not only harmful to the woman but will almost certainly
negate the benefits of joint custody for the child."'55 Although the
potential for continued spousal abuse should not bar adoption of
mandatory consideration of joint custody, Virginia legislators
should note that spousal abuse may be underreported and therefore
more pervasive than statistical data indicate. The possibility of
150. Id. (suggesting what courts would, in effect, say to parents if there was a presumption
of joint custody).
151. Bartlett & Stack, supra note 59, at 14.
152. Among the factors already present for determining what is in the "best interests" of
the child in Virginia is an assessment of the "role which each parent has played... in the
upbringing and care of the child." VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-124.3 (Michie 1950). See also supra
note 60 and accompanying text.
153. See Elkin, supra note 27, at 19 (comparing joint custody to divorce mediation, in that,
"both parents are empowered by the court to retain equal legal rights, authority, and
responsibility for the care and control of their child, much as in the intact family. Neither
parent's rights and authority are superior.").
154. See, e.g., Luepnitz, supra note 103, at 11 (not endorsing mandatory joint custody
because of the potential result of single mothers having less protection from abusive ex-
husbands).
155. Bartlett & Stack, supra note 59, at 37.
IMPROVING CUSTODY LAW IN VIRGINIA
continued spousal abuse should be considered by lawmakers when
considering a presumption that could potentially further such
abuse. 156
Despite the lack of a presumption or preference of joint custody,
data for custody awards in Virginia for the years 1991 through 1995
already show a rising trend toward joint custody arrangements.
Records for these years kept by the Virginia Department of Health
reveal that the number of maternal sole custody awards decreased
by seven percent while the number of joint custody awards
increased by forty-five percent during this time.'57 Sole custody
continues to be granted much more than joint custody, and then
primarily to mothers. 5 ' Without reviewing each individual case,
however, it is difficult to determine whether the disparity is due to
continued gender bias in courts or is simply a reflection of what is
indeed in the best interests of the child. Family law legislation in
Virginia should have as its primary focus the welfare and best
interests of each child, and not as its goal a raw statistical quota of
equality between parents.
In Virginia, future changes in attitudes among judges, lawyers,
social workers, and divorcing couples may mean that a presumption
of joint custody is unnecessary to achieve more balance in the num-
ber of sole and joint custody arrangements. A further refinement
of the "best interests" standard to include mandatory consideration
of joint custody, coupled with increased awareness of the impor-
tance of gender-neutral custody determinations, will best determine
when joint custody is truly in the best interests of the child.
ELIZA B. HUTCHISON
156. The Virginia Code presently requires courts to consider "any history of family abuse"
in determining what is in the best interests of the child. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Michie
1950). See also supra note 60 and accompanying text. "Family abuse" is defined as "any act
of violence ... which results in physical injury ... and which is committed by a person
against such person's family or household member." VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Michie 1950).
157. See Michael Ewing, A Preliminary Review of Child Custody Awards in Virginia
Divorces, 1991-1995, paper presented at the Virginia Fatherhood Conference (Feb. 22, 1997).
"Although 'joint custody' awards increased noticeably from 1991-1995, the percentage of
fathers awarded primary physical custody of their children decreased over this period.
Averaged over this [five]-year period, only 12.5% of fathers were awarded primary physical
custody of minor children through a sole custody or joint custody award." Id.
158. See id. Sole custody was granted to the father in 10.9% of the cases (6,737 cases); sole
custody was granted to the mother in 69.9% of the cases (43,158 cases); and joint custody was
granted in 15.5% of the cases (9,579 cases). The remaining 3.7% of cases (2,264 cases) were
disposed of as sole custody to a non-parent. See id.
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